"Just after liftoff, the primary and secondary O-rings at the base of the right-hand SRB failed. The Rogers Commission report, an official investigation into the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, noted: "At 0.678 seconds into the flight, photographic data show a strong puff of gray smoke was spurting from the vicinity of the aft field joint on the right Solid Rocket Booster.""
"During the flight, the Shuttle experienced several high-altitude wind shear events, all within design limits, but which caused the SRB steering system to be "more active than on any previous flight." At 58.788 second, a flickering flame was noted on the right SRB, at or near the aft field joint. That plume increased, and from approximately 62 seconds, the control system began to correct for the forces caused by the plume. This carried on for another nine seconds."
Space Shuttle Challenger disintegrated 73 seconds into flight, killing seven crew and exposing the management culture and decision-making that led NASA to launch on a freezing January day. Erosion was noted in the rubber O-rings sealing segments of the twin solid rocket boosters, and launch temperature was 36°F, 15° colder than any prior launch. Primary and secondary O-rings at the base of the right SRB failed just after liftoff, producing puffs of gray smoke. High-altitude wind shear made the SRB steering system unusually active. A flickering flame near the aft field joint breached the External Tank, the lower SRB strut severed, and a hydrogen tank structural failure released large amounts of liquid hydrogen, leading to catastrophic breakup.
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