Open-source software benefits from being publicly inspectable, yet most are downloaded as compiled binaries which mask their internal workings. Supply chain attacks can exploit this by altering binaries while leaving source code unchanged. Implementing reproducible builds ensures that the same source yields identical binaries, enabling verification that posted binaries are unaltered. Go 1.21.0 introduces fully reproducible builds, making it simpler for users to confirm the authenticity of binaries. This feature markedly improves the ability to detect supply chain attacks, emphasizing the importance of reproducibility in modern software security.
One of the key benefits of open-source software is that anyone can read the source code and inspect what it does. However, most software, even open-source software, is downloaded as compiled binaries, making inspection difficult.
The best way to address supply chain attacks on open-source projects is to make builds reproducible, ensuring that a build from the same sources produces identical outputs each time.
Go 1.21.0 is the first Go toolchain with perfectly reproducible builds, allowing users to verify that posted binaries are free of hidden changes without needing to inspect the code.
With reproducible builds, independent groups can verify binaries and detect supply chain attacks more effectively, making them crucial for open-source project security.
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