#command-and-control-infrastructure

#command-and-control-infrastructure

Retired Army Special Forces officer Mike Nelson criticized Hegseth's rhetoric, stating, 'That's a necessary end to achieve goals through military force - you have to kill people to achieve them. That's not the end. It's a weird obsession with death for the sake of it.'

The U.S. has discovered that air superiority and missile defense systems designed to counter tens/hundreds of aircraft and missiles is insufficient against asymmetric attacks of thousands of drones.

The economics are hard to ignore. Shooting down a drone with AeroVironment's LOCUST laser system costs less than $10, using just two to five seconds of laser energy. Compare that to the interceptor missiles currently used against Iranian drone swarms, which cost orders of magnitude more and are in short supply across allied arsenals.

The conduct of War is, therefore, the formation and conduct of the fighting. If this fighting was a single act, there would be no necessity for any further subdivision, but the fight is composed of a greater or less number of single acts, complete in themselves, which we call combats, as we have shown in the first chapter of the first book, and which form new units.

I have been working in Ukraine since 2019, first as an active Green Beret advising in an official capacity, then after leaving that service, directing special operations on the ground and more recently carrying hard-won lessons back to NATO before they are forgotten or overtaken by the next news cycle.

In the early hours of March 1, an Amazon data center in the UAE was struck by a drone, the company reported. Shortly afterward, another center belonging to the American tech giant suffered a direct hit. And a short time later, a third, this time in Bahrain, was damaged by another drone strike. Since Amazon is the preferred partner of many companies and governments in the region, the attacks caused immediate disruptions.

We've got no shortage of munitions. Our stockpiles of defensive and offensive weapons allow us to sustain this campaign as long as we need. Iran is hoping that we cannot sustain this, which is a really bad miscalculation.

Lead without authority. You may not have direct reports, yet you shape architecture, quality and the roadmap. Your leverage comes from artifacts, reviews and clear standards, not from title.I started by publishing a lightweight architecture template and a rollout checklist that the team could copy. That reduced ambiguity during design and cut review cycles by nearly 30 percent

Number one is speed takes priority over perfection. We can iterate to get to operational capability. And the second is that early soldier feedback is critical in order to make sure we're getting the right technology for the future fight, and then we want to be able to prove the demand signal before we spend big dollars on programs.

On paper, many of the world's most famous weapons looked like reliable successes. In practice, desert sand, jungle humidity, and arctic cold often had other ideas. Systems that performed well in testing or early combat sometimes broke down once environmental stress became unavoidable. Here, 24/7 Wall St. is taking a closer look at how the environment, not enemy fire, can quietly expose limits that designers never fully anticipated.

I've always had what I would consider a hacker mindset, a curiosity to take things apart, understand them, and use that knowledge to solve problems. That mindset took me on a circuitous route into the cybersecurity industry; after being kicked out of high school for hacking computer systems, I worked a range of jobs, managing office supply companies by day and cracking Wi-Fi networks by night until I started a Digital Forensics degree which led me to the world of security research.

The report catalogues a relentless barrage of cyber operations, most by state-sponsored groups, against EU and US industrial supply chains. It suggests the range of targets for these hackers has grown to encompass the broader industrial base of the US and Europe from German aerospace firms to UK carmakers. State-linked hackers have long targeted the global defence industry, but Luke McNamara, an analyst for Google's threat intelligence group, said they had seen more personalised and direct to individual targeting of employees.

The US Army's biggest AI gamble may not be on autonomous weapons, but instead whether Silicon Valley software can tackle the service's most tedious and, more often than not, grueling administrative jobs. Think less uncrewed aircraft and more behind-the-scenes tasks like recruiting, equipment maintenance, and endless gear inventories. Through a mix of new tools, redesigned workflows, and data integration, logisticians

Entering the cyber world is stepping into a warzone. Cyber is considered a war zone, and what happens there is described as cyberwar. But it's not that simple. War is conducted by nations (political), not undertaken by criminals (financial). Both are increasing in this war zone we call cyber, but the political threat is growing fast. Cyberwar is a complex subject, and a formal definition is difficult.

According to the Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth's memorandum on the Strategy, this AI-first status is to be achieved through four broad aims: Incentivizing internal DOD experimentation with AI models. Identifying and eliminating bureaucratic obstacles in the way of model integration. Focusing the U.S.'s military investment to shore up the U.S.'s "asymmetric advantages" in areas including AI computing, model innovation, entrepreneurial dynamism, capital markets, and operational data.